PREPRINT – PLEASE CITE PUBLISHED VERSION “Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder”

The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism (Gerrans 2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008). In this paper, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone‟s (2008) account. Second, I discuss various studies of individuals with autism and argue that they are best explained by positing a higher-level, domain-specific ToM module. Acknowledgements I wish to thank Edouard Machery and Arthur Falk for extensive comments on a draft of thi